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The paper seeks to investigate changes in Brazil’s activism within the UN Human 
Rights Council (HRC) between 2006 and 2020 and addresses the modifications of 
status-seeking strategies (of social mobility, creativity, and competition) applied by 
the state within this international body. My claim is that Brazil under the Bolsonaro 
administration chose the role of the defender of the faith advocating for a recreation 
of the global human rights protection system over being a good international citizen 
committed to the maintenance and development of this system. This role was selected 
in conformity with a populist political agenda based on a conservative set of values 
that the state’s diplomacy had to promote. The changes, exemplified by Brazil’s 
conduct within the HRC since 2019, undermined the state’s prestige and moral 
authority that led to status losses.
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RESUMEN
El trabajo busca investigar los cambios en el activismo de Brasil dentro del Consejo de 
Derechos Humanos (CDH) de la ONU entre 2006 y 2020 y aborda las modificaciones 
de las estrategias de búsqueda de estatus (de movilidad, creatividad y competencia 
social) aplicadas por el Estado dentro de este organismo internacional. Mi argumento 
es que Brasil, bajo el gobierno de Bolsonaro, eligió el papel de defensor de la fe que 
aboga por una recreación del sistema global de protección de los derechos humanos en 
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lugar de ser un buen ciudadano internacional comprometido con el mantenimiento 
y desarrollo de este sistema. Este papel fue seleccionado en conformidad con una 
agenda política populista basada en un conjunto de valores conservadores que la 
diplomacia del Estado debía promover. Los cambios, ejemplificados por la conducta 
de Brasil en el CDH desde 2019, socavaron el prestigio y la autoridad moral del 
Estado, lo que condujo a pérdidas de estatus.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Brasil, Consejo de Derechos Humanos, búsqueda de estatus, 
autoridad moral.
Introduction
While the legacy that Ernesto Araújo left behind after stepping down 
from his post of head of the Itamaraty1 will certainly be assessed in the 
upcoming months, one point remains already undisputed. As announced 
in January 2019, the administration of the ultraconservative Jair 
M.  Bolsonaro has engaged in the creation of a new and unprecedented 
external activism for Brazil. Coined as nationalist and fundamentalist 
(Casarões, 2020), conservative (Medeiros, Vilas-Boas and Andrade, 2019, 
March 21), anti-globalist (Rodrigues, 2019), submissive (based on an 
automatic and unconditional alignment with the state’s core ally) (Fuser, 
2019), chaotic (Lima and Albuquerque, 2019) or even messianic (Gabatz & 
Angelin, 2021, p. 123), the foreign policy underwent a process of profound 
redefinition. Core values and principles which served as guidelines for 
Brazilian diplomats since the beginning of the 20th century have been at 
best questioned and at worst, refuted. Such was the case of multilateralism: 
one of the drivers of the state’s initiatives at international fora ever since 
the creation of the Republic, it has been vilified by Ernesto Araújo (2019, 
November 21). The redefinition of the guiding principles was followed by 
a reformulation of Brazil’s key allies as well as the themes and niches that 
the South American actor wanted to shape. 
Human rights protection has been identified by academics as one of the 
main areas affected by foreign policy reformulations of the current adminis-
tration (Spektor, 2019). To scrutinize the scope of these changes, this paper 
aims to compare Brazil’s standing in the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) 
since 2019 with the causes promoted by the Lula da Silva (20062–2010), 
Dilma Rousseff (2011–2016), and Michel Temer (2016–2018) administra-
tions within this international body. Focus is put on a global rather than 
1  As the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is commonly called.
2  The first three years of Lula da Silva’s first term in office have not been included in the 
analysis as the Human Rights Council held its first session in June 2006, substituting the former 
Human Rights Commission. 
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a regional institution as Brazil in the past three decades has been recognized 
as a global player using supraregional fora as leverage to gain visibility and 
construct its image of a norm entrepreneur and promoter of human rights 
(Stolte, 2015; Nogueira, 2017; Carvalho, 2020; Sá e Silva, 2020). Also, the 
global forum permits to capture the Brazilian realignment of partnerships 
into new coalitions with European, African, and Asian states. The paper is 
driven by the following research questions: how did the state’s engagement 
within the HRC change (in terms of resolutions and decisions introduced 
and/or sponsored, as well as voting patterns)? What were the new coalitions 
Brazil engaged in at the HRC? How did these adjustments translate into 
shifts in status-seeking strategies? What is the impact of these realignments 
on the state’s international status?
My study is aided by the conceptual contributions on the status and 
status-seeking strategies (Wohlforth et al. 2018; Hurrell, 2006; Larson & 
Shevchenko, 2010; 2014) and recent research on the Brazilian far-right 
populist foreign policy (Verbeeck & Zaslove, 2017; Chryssogelos, 2017; 
Sá Guimarães & Oliveira e Silva, 2021). My claim is that Brazil under the 
Bolsonaro administration neglected the role of a good international citizen 
and engaged in performing the role of the defender of the faith. This role 
was selected in conformity with the populist political agenda, especially the 
conservative set of values that the state’s diplomacy had to promote. The 
changes, exemplified by Brazil’s conduct within the HRC since 2019, led to 
the abandonment of status enhancement through increasing prestige and 
moral authority causing status losses.
The empirical part of the study is based on document analysis which al-
lowed to identify and categorize causes promoted by Brazil and the country’s 
positions towards human rights violations in several states addressed at the 
HRC. It also discerns between resolutions and decisions introduced by/on be-
half of Brazil, (co-)sponsored by the state, and Brazil’s voting patterns, includ-
ing the actor’s vote on amendments to resolutions. In addition to resolutions 
and decisions, the primary sources used in the research include the reports of 
45 regular sessions3 and 28 special sessions of the HRC, as well as the Brazil-
ian statements explaining its vote and other comments available on the HRC 
Extranet website. To capture discursive practices handling the matter of inter-
national human rights promotion the paper also includes data obtained from 
content analysis of official speeches made by Brazilian presidents and foreign 
affairs ministers.
The article starts from a brief presentation of the understanding of status 
and status-seeking strategies. The following section reflects on the notion of 
populism as applied to foreign policy research and its applicability to the case 
of Brazil’s external activism. The next part briefly elaborates on references to 
human rights protection made by Brazilian decision-makers and continues 




with an overview of major changes in the state’s activities within the HRC 
since 2019. The last part presents concluding remarks.
Status and status seeking
Status is considered as an analytical category appropriate for scrutinizing the 
place of states in the international system (Holsti, 1970). The notion of sta-
tus allows to refer to the location of a state in the global stratified structure. 
Frameworks conceptualizing status as a club good also highlight the hierar-
chical aspect of status (Larson et al., 2014, p. 15). The presence, admission, 
or exclusion of the state from groupings such as the club of permanent UN 
Security Council, the G7 of the largest advanced economies, and nuclear 
powers impacts the country’s international standing. Despite a focus on ma-
terial capabilities such as military strength and economic performance as 
status markers determining an actor’s place in the global hierarchy, the past 
decade experienced a surge in research capturing an extended reading of 
status (Volgy et al., 2011; Paul et al., 2014; Renshon, 2017; Wohlforth et al., 
2018). This alternative angle does recognize the material aspect of status, yet 
it goes beyond such understanding by exploring status as a cognitive cat-
egory. Such is the approach to research on status proposed by Larson, Paul, 
and Wohlforth (2014, p. 7) who define it as “collective beliefs about a ranked 
ordering of valued attributes”. This outline acknowledges the hierarchical 
nature of status; however, it emphasizes first and foremost that an actor’s 
positioning in the international structure is socially constructed and per-
ceptual. Kalevi Holsti, writing in 1970 about states’ roles, linked them with 
statuses, which were determined by policymakers’ impressions. According 
to him, status identification was determined by the perceptions shared by 
decision-makers: “it seems reasonable to assume that those responsible for 
making decisions and taking actions for the state are aware of international 
status distinctions and that their policies reflect this awareness” (Holsti 1970, 
p. 242). Later works coped with the question of whose collective beliefs mat-
tered in assessing the state’s status and discerned between self-attributed 
status (by the country’s political and intellectual elites and the rest of the 
society) and recognition received by the actor from other members of the 
international system (Hurrell, 2006, p. 4). The latter was indicated as crucial 
to determine the actor’s positioning on the global stage. Furthermore, this 
distinction allowed to capture tensions arising when the status ascribed to 
the state by its elites differed from the perceptions held by other countries, 
leading to status inconsistencies (Volgy et al., 2011).
Discrepancies in the ways status is assessed are among the factors trigger-
ing efforts made by state actors to influence the perceptions of other members 
of the international system. Through the declaration and performance of in-
ternational roles, understood as functions states assume in the international 
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system based on role conceptions4, states strive to align the internal and ex-
ternal understandings of one’s place in the world. These endeavors have been 
referred to in the literature as status-seeking. Status-seeking, closely-knit with 
the desire for recognition and prestige,5 and fueled by the intrinsic quest to 
strengthen ones standing within a hierarchy, relates to the state’s self-esteem 
identified among its core needs and foreign policy objectives (Murray, 2019, p. 
13). Status enhancement efforts can be identified in the behavior of all sover-
eign states, including small states (Carvalho & Neumann, 2015), although cer-
tain players attract more attention from researchers. Be it due to their high as-
set levels, significant historical shifts of their international standing or current 
increased activism which ensure that their efforts are not going unnoticed, 
status-seeking strategies of global players such as Russia, China, India, Turkey, 
and Brazil constitute an extensive body of literature focused on state’s interna-
tional mobility (Deng, 2008; Volgy et al., 2011; Hurrell 2006; Wohlforth, 2009; 
Larson & Shevchenko, 2010; Stolte, 2015; Renshon, 2017; Basrur & Estrada, 
2017; Esteves et al., 2020; Curanović, 2020). 
Researchers, adopting varied approaches, proposed several, partially 
overlapping, conceptualizations of status-enhancement strategies, i.a. initiat-
ing and engaging in conflicts, arms race, and other hard-balancing options, 
soft-balancing, bandwagoning, recognitive discursive and material practices 
(such as gaining a great-power voice, increasing military power, and assuring 
spheres of influence), and social mobility, competition, and creativity strate-
gies (Hurrell, 2006; Larson & Shevchenko, 2010; 2014; Renshon, 2017; Mur-
ray, 2019). It is important to note that, rather than opting for one particular 
strategy, states apply a blend of several approaches to gain visibility, recogni-
tion, and prestige leading to status increase. 
In the case of Brazil, a country that can be considered as an archetypi-
cal aspirational power, unsatisfied with its status and committed to increasing 
it (Mares & Trinkunas, 2016), hard-balancing strategies are not considered 
as options by policymakers. Emphasizing the commitment to principles of 
non-intervention and peaceful resolution of conflicts, Brazil gave priority 
to soft approaches (Sotero & Armijo, 2007). Faced with limited material ca-
pacities, policymakers on numerous occasions turned to ideational resources 
such as the promotion of norms, values, and causes as means to acquire sta-
tus. Endeavors to increase its global standing focused on moral authority – 
“proper6 behavior as judged within the specific framework laid down histori-
4  National role conceptions are defined as “policymakers’ own definitions of the general 
kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions, suitable to their state, and of the functions, 
if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordi-
nate regional systems” (Holsti, 1970, p. 246).
5  For a definition of prestige, honor and respect see Larson et al. (2014, pp. 7–17) and 
Curanović (2020, p. 84).
6  The definition of proper conduct which distinguishes the moral subject is – as the defini-




cally by the leading powers of the system” (Wohlforth et al., 2018, p. 533) – and 
prestige (Larson & Shevchenko, 2014, pp. 49–52; Stolte, 2015; Esteves et al., 
2020). They were to be exposed and further strengthened, ensuring the state 
recognition via the existing global organizational setup. The international hu-
man rights protection system offered institutional space for smaller states and 
middle powers like Brazil to perform the roles of good international citizens 
and, therefore, maintain or increase its standing as moral powers. This niche 
permitted the state to act as a normative entrepreneur to raise awareness and 
contribute to solutions to global problems. What is particularly interesting in 
the case of Brazil is that the area of human rights protection exposed the ac-
tor’s commitment to normative underpinnings traditionally associated with 
Western values and priorities, on one hand, and causes raised by developing 
nations, members of the Global South, on the other (Carvalho, 2020, p. 25).
Placing varying emphasis on several values and topics, the administra-
tions of Lula da Silva, Rousseff, Temer, and Bolsonaro all claimed that human 
rights protection was a crucial part of Brazil’s foreign policy.7 Applying the 
conceptual framework proposed by Larson and Shevchenko (2010; 2014) of 
social mobility8, creativity9, and competition10, it is possible to identify a blend 
of these strategies applied by Brazilian policymakers to promote Brazil’s im-
age as a moral authority in the endeavor to increase its status through human 
rights advocacy. States employing mobility strategies are expected to voice 
their commitment to the protection of human rights listed in international 
conventions and other normative acts, seek membership in international core 
organizations promoting them, and align with actors perceived as exemplary 
in protecting these rights to promote commonly acknowledged causes, e.g., 
fundamental political and civil rights. The posture would be followed by dec-
larations coming from the decision-makers about their full commitment to 
protecting human rights. Social creativity strategies envisage discursive prac-
primarily by norms and values promoted by developed capitalist Western countries under the 
leadership of the world hegemon, the U.S. These states identify proper conduct with world sys-
tem maintenance, respect for international law, peaceful resolution of conflicts, human rights 
promotion. Authors referring to the moral authority of the state draw from classic works of 
Émile Durkheim (Sociology and Philosophy and Professional Ethics and Civic Morals), see Hall, 
1997; Neumann, 2014; Wohlforth et al., 2018.
7  For more details, see section 5.
8  Social mobility assumes behavior emulating higher-ranking powers as the lower-ranked 
actor accepts and follows the rules of the international game. Social mobility applies to states that 
adhere to international regimes and promote norms and values supported by relevant actors (the 
world’s great powers and/or actors with a recognized high position within a particular coopera-
tion area). 
9  Social creativity consists of the promotion of new and alternative attributes which give the 
status aspiring state competitive advantage over the higher-ranked.
10  Social competition, of a more conflictive nature, takes place when the status aspiring state 
identifies areas in which it could outstrip the higher-ranked actors and engages in activities chal-
lenging the existing stratifications.
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tices also emphasizing such obligation, yet indicting gaps and deficiencies 
in the institutional setup which need to be overcome. A state using this ap-
proach offers to bring in new perspectives into the debate, due to its distinctive 
profile and experiences – for instance, affiliation with the developing world 
leading to increased interest and authority to promote social and economic 
rights. Social competition can be identified as postures defying acknowledged 
understandings of fundamental rights and freedoms and opposing them to 
alternative sets of values or unconventional interpretations of certain norms 
and standards. Such an approach can be manifested by abstaining from vot-
ing on resolutions condemning human rights abuses. Criticized by Western 
liberal democracies, the posture is frequently adopted by developing countries 
and explained by a Southern point of view which places the value of dialogue 
maintenance at all costs and non-interference in domestic matters over more 
assertive ways of protecting human rights. Contrary to social creativity behav-
ior, social competition entails more confrontational attitudes, at times based 
on dichotomist and conflictive assessments of the subject matter in question. 
Actors using this strategy perceive the set of human rights norms they defend 
as threatened; their promotion becomes a moral imperative. Discursively so-
cial competition would be manifested by statements undermining the existing 
human rights protection architecture and claims of a deep value crisis which 
the status aspirant could handle due to its moral superiority.
Between 2006 and 201811 Brazil applied all three approaches in its conduct 
within the HRC, whereas in 2019 and 2020 Brazilian policymakers resorted to 
mobility and competition strategies. The differences in Brazil’s activism derive 
from distinct roles played by Brazil in both periods, stemming from diverse 
identities and objectives. If until the end of 2018 Brazil identified its function 
of a good state sustaining a normative order as an appropriate way to manifest 
its moral authority, since 2019 the state, as a defender of the faith12, adopted 
a confrontational approach. It was based on the claim that the human rights 
protection system – corrupted and decaying – required reconstruction. If in 
the first decade of the HRC Brazil, within the mobility strategy, introduced 
and sponsored documents on topics important to Western liberal democra-
cies, it neglected this approach after 2019, proving its affinity with the West 
by a more critical standing towards selected human rights offenders identified 
as Brazil’s foes. In regard to the state’s creativity in human rights promotion, 
Brazil during the Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff administrations aimed at 
raising awareness and supporting initiatives of other members of the Global 
South on subjects related to such rights as just access to medicines and the 
11  Although shifts leading to a partial alignment with standings applied since 2019 became 
noticeable during the Temer administration and will be highlighted in the fifth section.
12  This role is not limited to strong commitments to religious values, but generally to causes, 
norms and ideas deemed crucial by policymakers and “those who espouse the defender of the 
faith national role conception presumably undertake special responsibilities to guarantee ideo-




highest healthcare standards as well as the elimination of hunger and pov-
erty. Country delegates also voted in favor of documents introduced by Cuba 
and other members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM); a posture mostly 
abandoned by the Bolsonaro government. A striking change occurred also in 
the way Brazil employed social competition within the HRC: before 2019 ten-
sions between Western states and the Latin American player arose mainly due 
to its restraint in votings on human rights abuses in such states as North Ko-
rea, Sudan, and Sri Lanka. The Bolsonaro government, persistently asserting 
its distinctiveness from liberal democracies, assumed competitive postures by 
promoting a conservative normative agenda on such matters as the protection 
of the family, women’s rights, and persecution of religions.
Before moving to a more detailed analysis of changing narratives and prac-
tices reflecting Brazil’s human rights record within the HRC and for a deeper 
understanding of the changes in the state’s participation in the body, a brief 
overview of the new features of the Brazilian foreign policy is required.
A populist foreign policy13
The claim that the Bolsonaro administration provides yet another example 
of a populist political style should not raise objections. What enabled the 
far-right statesman to come to power was a deep national crisis of political 
representation and economic performance. Political parties in power for over 
two decades have been to varying degrees discredited by a corruption scan-
dal of an unprecedented scale which had dire consequences for the country’s 
economic output. Jair Bolsonaro and his supporters used this opportunity to 
position the former army captain as a figure rejecting the rules of conven-
tional policymaking, a political steadfast outsider who was not engaged in 
corrupt practices (Casarões, 2019). He was thus not a member of the elites 
(although these claims can surprise coming from a person who served seven 
consecutive terms in the Brazilian Congress) but a true patriot representing 
the people, tired of traditional politics. Already in office, the Brazilian head of 
state adopted an antagonistic and Manichean discourse starkly juxtaposing 
virtuous Brazilian citizens with corrupt elites and bandits (Bolsonaro, 2019, 
January 1). Bolsonaro’s most ardent supporters – former foreign affairs minis-
ter Ernesto Araújo, federal deputy and member of the commission of foreign 
affairs and defense in the lower house of the Brazilian Congress Eduardo Bol-
sonaro, Filipe Martins, special foreign policy advisor to President Bolsonaro, 
and Damares Alves, minister of human rights – constitute the ideological axis 
of his administration. Araújo, Bolsonaro, and Martins are admirers and fol-
lowers of Olavo de Carvalho, a self-proclaimed philosopher and the ideologi-
13  For a detailed conceptual clarification see Verbeek and Zaslove (2017) and Chryssogelos 
(2017).
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cal mentor of the Bolsonaro family, described as “the intellectual founder of 
the Brazilian far-right” (Duarte, 2019, December 28) known for his radicalism 
and propensity for conspiracy theories. The conservative values of Damares 
Alves reflect the moral and social agenda of evangelical churches, a stakehold-
er that in the past two decades gained significant influence over Brazil’s politi-
cal life (Zilla, 2020). Minister Alves, an evangelical pastor herself, represents 
therefore the interests of a powerful political actor committed to curtailing 
liberal family and lifestyle visions. Olavists and evangelicals are seen by other 
segments of the government – the military and neoliberals – as the ideological 
fraction as they place a set of identified principles and values over pragmatic 
postures focused on the state’s material interests. 
If on the domestic level the Bolsonaro administration uses the fear of loss 
of one’s material and social status (which millions of Brazilians saw compro-
mised by the economic crisis) – therefore strengthening and exploiting status 
anxiety14 – a similar logic underpins the perception of the international system. 
Its consequence is a rupture with traditional ways of policymaking not only 
internally but also externally. Ernesto Araújo made numerous references to 
the exogenous threats the state is facing: globalism, socialism, cultural Marx-
ism, and communism.15 The worldview of the first foreign affairs minister in 
the Bolsonaro cabinet was clearly an antagonistic one: Brazil was presented 
as a member of a conservative informal avant-garde coalition that needs to 
resist rogue globalist forces (Araújo, 2019, January 2; 2019 September 11). 
As observed by Sá Guimarães and Oliveira e Silva (2021, p. 350), within this 
logic Brazil was morally obliged to engage in a civilizational struggle which 
required combating liberal institutionalism, for global institutions constituted 
the framework that legitimized international groups of elites against the will of 
the people in sovereign states. If criticism of globalism and the architecture of 
international institutions along with a strong attachment to sovereignty were 
not new in Brazil’s external affairs and can be found in the narratives on the 
foreign policy of the Lula da Silva, Rousseff, and Temer administrations, the 
radicalism permeating the new policymakers’ discourse was unprecedented. 
An explicit classification of states into friends and foes was a novelty and went 
against past efforts to promote Brazil as a country able to maintain good rela-
tions with all international actors (Interview with Brazil’s President Lula on 
his legacy, 2010, September 30). What distinguished the foreign policy dis-
course of the Bolsonaro administration were references to international con-
spiracies and complots that could harm Brazil’s interests and values (Casarões, 
2020, p. 83). 
14  This logic was indicated as a hallmark of populist policies already by Seymour M. Lipset 
(1955). 





The traditional principles which members of the ideological fraction usu-
ally referred to were that of God, homeland, and family. Deus, Pátria, Família 
is not a new catchphrase, it reminds us of the slogans of large-scale protests 
organized by conservative social movements against the government of João 
Goulart in 1964 as well as of the military regime that followed shortly after 
(Cordeiro, 2021). Yet, contrary to the administration of Jair Bolsonaro, the 
junta’s foreign policy was more restrained in applying these values on the in-
ternational level, guided by pragmatism (Cervo & Bueno, 2008). What distin-
guished the administration of Jair Bolsonaro is the fact that far-right populism 
as a style of governance was not limited to the domestic sphere, as had been 
the case of, for instance, the Getúlio Vargas era, but became ingrained in the 
country’s foreign policy (Sá Guimarães & Oliveira e Silva, 2021, p. 352). There-
fore, since 2019 and for the first time in the history of Brazilian diplomacy, one 
of the driving forces of the Brazilian external engagement was the belief that 
the state is morally obliged to defend Christianity and traditional family val-
ues, as they were threatened by leftist forces in the global cultural struggle. The 
international human rights architecture with the HRC at its center became an 
important arena for Brazil’s performance as a defender of the faith. 
Human rights in the political discourse
With the adoption of the Constitution in 1988 (Title I, Article 4, Point II) hu-
man rights gained explicit recognition as one of the core principles guiding 
the country’s foreign policy. Their protection was thus seen as both a moral 
obligation for the Brazilian diplomatic corps and a niche enabling the country 
to build up prestige and international recognition. Between 2006 and 2020 
all Brazilian heads of state and ministers of foreign affairs referred to human 
rights protection in speeches addressed to both domestic and international 
audiences. Nevertheless, significant changes in the way Brazil’s international 
commitment to human rights protection is perceived are discernible in the 
last two years.
Presidents Lula da Silva, Dilma Rousseff, and Michel Temer as well as their 
heads of diplomacy all emphasized their strong commitment to human rights 
protection. They reminded that Brazil was party to international treaties con-
stituting the legal-normative human rights protection framework of binding 
nature. The state’s political elites, therefore, acknowledged the fundamental 
human rights norms and assured of their obligation to implement them in-
ternally, assuming thus a posture that fitted within a social mobility strategy. 
Given the institution in question – modern liberal democracies bound by the 
rule of law do not contest the human rights principle – such standing was 
expected. Signs of Brazil’s efforts to strengthen the normative system can also 
be distinguished in declarations about the state’s aspirations to be not only 
a norm-taker but also a norm-maker. President Lula da Silva and Minister 
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Amorim stressed that Brazil contributed to the institutional setup of the HRC 
by promoting the universal periodic review of countries’ mechanisms and 
voluntary human rights goals (Amorim, 2009, p. 432). Brazil further aimed 
at gaining visibility by advocating for economic, social, and cultural rights. 
Among the main promoted causes were the right to development, including 
the fight against hunger and poverty, universal access to medication, and the 
impact of the global economic crisis on human rights. Another important is-
sue area the country engaged in was the combat of racism. Brazilian policy-
makers were also using this opportunity to highlight Brazil’s internal successes 
to eliminate hunger and poverty, and willingness to engage in technical co-
operation projects to share its own success stories with other nations. Presi-
dent Lula da Silva (2007, September 25) was particularly vocal in addressing 
the world’s obligation to fight hunger, poverty, and inequalities as well as ad-
vertising Brazilian homemade, tried-and-tested solutions to these problems. 
A focus on topics exposing Brazilian achievements coupled with an insistence 
on the handling global challenges at times overlooked by the most developed 
economies can therefore be considered a social creativity strategy.
Despite the administration’s efforts to perform the role of a good inter-
national citizen guided by the principle of human rights protection, the state 
also attracted attention due to its ambivalent standing towards regimes no-
torious for human rights abuses, especially between 2006 and 2010. Policy-
makers faced with accusations of disregard for fundamental human rights 
were trying to defend the country’s posture. According to Celso Amorim 
(2009, pp. 432–433), Brazil was choosing constructive cooperation and 
dialogue over conflict and condemnation, which would only lead to the 
isolation of the accused country. The head of the diplomacy expressed his 
frustration over criticism faced by Brazil at the 65th session of the UN Gen-
eral Assembly, calling such posture arrogant and criticizing the “moral su-
periority” which some members of the international community conferred 
upon themselves (Amorim, 2010, p. 147). The palpable irritation reflected 
a deeper disappointment over the outcomes of Brazil’s efforts to strengthen 
its status through social competition. The approach of holding to the non-
intervention principle, dear to Brazil as a member of the Global South, did 
not bring the expected gains and diverted the international audience’s at-
tention from the state’s successes to controversial postures. Dilma Rousseff, 
aware of the critique, decided to introduce adjustments to Brazil’s policy and 
made sure to advertise the modification. In an interview for the Washington 
Post after her election in 2010, asked about Brazil’s lenient posture towards 
women’s rights in Iran, Ms. Rousseff replied that her government would as-
sume a more explicit standing towards the violators within the UN body 
(Weymouth, 2010, December 3). She made this also clear when speaking for 
the first time at the UN General Assembly in September 2011: “There are 
violations in all countries, without exception. Let us recognize this reality 




without mincing words, the flagrant cases of violation, wherever they occur” 
(Rousseff, 2011, September 21). On the other hand, what stayed unchanged 
was the policymakers’ posture of avoiding critical comments about human 
rights records in Cuba and Venezuela. Questioned about this matter, Rouss-
eff ’s first foreign affairs minister Antonio Patriota gave answers in line with 
the argumentation used by his predecessor – humans rights protection had 
to be less selective and politically motivated (Rossi, 2011, January 29). Slight 
changes in the way Brazil addressed the issue of human rights violations in 
other states were introduced by the Temer government. The main change 
referred to the fact that Brazil, mainly through the discourse of minister 
Aloysio Nunes Ferreira, voiced criticism of the human rights record of the 
Venezuelan regime (Ferreira, 2019, March 7).
Between 2006 and 2018, human rights were depicted as an important 
area of Brazilian international activism – the country’s commitment to their 
promotion and protection remained an unquestioned guiding principle of 
its external activism. The main differences consisted in the postures towards 
practices of condemning human rights violators. The changes notable in the 
administration’s discourse after January 2019 were of a different nature.
The assessment of the approach adopted by the current government in the 
international debate on human rights is complex and controversy prone as 
Jair Bolsonaro made over the past twenty years numerous comments depre-
ciating and criticizing the rights of i.a. women, indigenous people, members 
of the LGBTQ+ community, victims of the military rule, and the poor. These 
statements came again to the limelight during the presidential campaign and 
his electoral victory, making international headlines (Londoño & Darlington, 
2018, October 28; Phillips, 2018 October 29). The critical approach towards 
human rights was maintained after January 2019, although in official decla-
rations this was (compared to past statements) tempered and expressed in 
a more moderate manner. In his inaugural speech, President Bolsonaro re-
ferred to “the distortion of human rights”. They have been presented as an ide-
ology that “protects the bandits and criminalizes police officers” (Bolsonaro, 
2019, January 1). Speaking for the first time as head of state in front of an 
international audience, President Bolsonaro (2019, January 22) also referred 
to “true human rights” the country would defend. These were clear signals of 
a new goal: rather than sustaining the global human rights protection system, 
Brazil challenged its normative underpinnings aiming at a reconstruction of 
this system. In his first speech at the UN General Assembly, President Bolson-
aro assured of Brazil’s “uncompromising commitment to the highest stand-
ards in human rights”, yet a focus on family and God along with the obligation 
to defend the society from criminals suggested that Brazil had a very narrow 
and ultraconservative understanding of human rights. This vision would be 
defended in international organizations including the UN bodies as, accord-
ing to the new administration, “The UN can help defeat the materialistic and 
ideological climate that puts in check some of the basic principles of human 
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dignity” (Bolsonaro 2019, September 24). Similar views were expressed by the 
head of Itamaraty. A cause particularly promoted by Araújo at the UN (2019, 
September 27) was religious freedom: the diplomat made references to the 
increase in persecutions of Christians, which did not resonate with topics pro-
moted by Brazil earlier. 
As the Bolsonaro government has been criticized for neglecting or even 
violating human rights in Brazil, using this issue area to strengthen the coun-
try’s status would not seem plausible. Yet, efforts to use global fora, including 
the HRC, to promote conservative values of God, the protection of the fam-
ily and the “innocence of children” have been indicated by members of the 
Brazilian administration as a core element of Brazil’s international position-
ing. The basis for Brazil’s moral authority was its membership in the club of 
a new conservative avant-garde of the West, along with the US (under Don-
ald Trump), Israel, Hungary, and Poland (Araújo, 2019, January 2). Equipped 
with such moral authority, making it fit for a renewal of the international sys-
tem, the state engaged in a cultural crusade to combat “nihilism disguised as 
multilateralism”, communism and Marxism, which were destroying humanity 
(Araújo, 2019, June 10). Therefore, the Brazilian administration, rather than 
promoting the image of Brazil as a good international citizen, conceptualized 
Brazil as a defender of the faith. Seen from this angle, the discourse of the 
administration can be classified as a somewhat distorted effort of status en-
hancement through social competition. The next section shows whether and 
how political declarations were followed by Brazil’s engagement in the HRC.
Brazil in the HRC: constants and variables
To verify the changes in Brazil’s activism within the HRC I analyzed the sub-
ject matters of resolutions and decisions introduced by the country (or on 
behalf of it), sponsored and co-sponsored by Brazil, the state’s vote on amend-
ments to documents, and on resolutions/decisions which were not adopted 
without a vote. Noteworthy shifts between 2006 and 2020 concern the Brazil-
ian vote on resolutions addressing human rights violations in several coun-
tries, including the country’s stance towards the regimes in Cuba, Venezuela, 
and Nicaragua; the support for initiatives promoted by developing countries; 
and several causes traditionally supported by Brazil, in particular religious 
freedom, the rights of sexual minorities, the protection of the family as well as 
women’ and girls’ rights.
Resolutions on human rights violations
Although Brazil during the Lula da Silva administration was praised for its 




social and economic rights (Costa da Silva, 2020; Sá e Silva, 2020), the coun-
try also faced criticism because of its resistance to condemn human rights 
violations in a number of undemocratic regimes (Ricupero, 2010, August 29). 
In 2006 Brazil, along with Cuba and Mexico, voted in favor of a decision ad-
dressing the issue of human rights violations in Darfur introduced by African 
states, which was considered by European countries as too restrained. Brazil 
was the only Latin American country to abstain from voting on the amend-
ments proposed by European states (Cuba voted against, other Latin Ameri-
can states – in favor). In 2009, Brazil abstained from voting on a resolution on 
the People’s Republic of Korea, explaining that this way it was giving the Kim 
regime a chance to maintain dialogue with the Council. At the 11th special 
session, also in 2009, convened to discuss the human rights situation in Sri 
Lanka, Brazil co-sponsored a resolution introduced by the Sri Lankan rep-
resentative and did not support European efforts to amend the text. These 
were clear manifestations of a social competition strategy that brought nega-
tive outcomes as Brazil was criticized for such postures, as mentioned earlier.
Despite Brazil’s complaints about the selective and political nature of hu-
man rights monitoring and protection in the Human Rights Commission, 
spotted by state officials also within the HRC (Amorim, 2010, p. 147), Brazil’s 
neutrality was also questionable. Between 2006 and 2010 the Latin American 
actor voted in favor of resolutions condemning human rights violations in 
Palestine. The Council’s focus on abuses committed by Israel, as evidenced by 
the number of resolutions addressing the issue adopted in regular as well as 
special sessions16, was considered politically motivated as numerous violations 
in other parts of the world never received similar attention (Asano & Nader, 
2011, p. 128). 
During Dilma Rousseff ’s first term in office from 2011 to 2014, Brazil’s 
vote on resolutions condemning human rights abuses in specific countries 
was less controversial. Brazil supported the resolutions on Iran, Syria, North 
Korea, and Sri Lanka. In 2011 Brazil also co-sponsored a resolution on the 
human rights situation in Libya, adopted at the 15th special session. The coun-
try’s posture changed in March 2015 with the Brazilian abstention in the case 
of both Iran and Syria. The Temer administration maintained such a posture 
towards Iran. In the case of Syria, Brazil voted in favor of the resolutions, how-
ever, country representatives expressed concerns also raised by the previous 
government. They referred to the interference of external actors into the con-
flict, including arms supply, which was aggravating the situation. Further, at 
all three sessions in 2018 Brazil supported several amendments submitted by 
Russia. The amendments called upon states and non-state actors to render 
support to the parties engaged in the Syrian conflict, referred more explicitly 
to the engagement of several terrorist groups in the conflict, and criticized 
16  Until 2020, out of 28 sessions 7 were held to discuss the situation in Palestine and 1, the 
situation in Lebanon.
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“unilateral coercive measures” applied against the Assad regime as leading to 
a deterioration of the human rights situation within the war-thorn country. 
Such a position once again voiced the concerns of Brazil as a member of the 
Global South driven by the non-intervention principle and thus ready to pro-
vide competitive standing in the international body. 
The main modifications notable in Brazil’s standing towards the debate on 
human rights violations since 2019 relate to Israel. For the first time since 2006 
Brazil voted against the resolution on human rights in the occupied Syrian 
Golan and abstained from voting on the issue of Israeli settlements in the Oc-
cupied Palestinian Territory. Explaining such posture, Brazilian representa-
tives pointed to an excessive number of resolutions referring to Israel within 
the HRC (Brazil, 2019b) and the selective nature of the draft tackling the situ-
ation in the Golan Heights as it omitted abuses in Syria (Brazil, 2019c). The 
shift was a consequence of a major recalibration of Brazil’s strategic partner-
ships. In an effort to align with the position of the United States in internation-
al organizations, Brazil followed the direction of its partner, who complained 
of the anti-Israeli bias within the HRC. Additionally, as already signaled by 
Ernesto Araújo in his inauguration speech, the Latin American state perceived 
Israel as a crucial ally. In the diplomat’s view, both countries, bound by the 
Judeo-Christian tradition, were members of the coalition of virtuous states in 
the global cultural war to save humanity. 
Another alteration visible in 2019 referred to the state’s antagonistic pos-
ture towards the regimes in Venezuela and Nicaragua. In the case of Nicara-
gua, Brazil was one of the main sponsors of the initiatives in 2019 and 2020. In 
the Venezuelan case, the country sponsored in 2019 and introduced in 2020, 
at the request of the Trump administration (Sá Guimarães & Oliveira e Silva, 
2021, p. 355), a draft proposal condemning human rights abuses committed 
by the Maduro regime. This was unprecedented as Brazil’s leftist presidents 
firmly avoided referring to this issue, including when explicitly questioned in 
interviews (Vivanco, 2015, June 29). The Temer administration in September 
2018 voted in favor of a resolution on Venezuela introduced by Peru, although 
the country did not sponsor it. Temer’s successor went further, leaving aside 
the non-interference principle, which was emphasized since the beginning 
of the 20th century in Brazil’s relations with regional partners. These modifi-
cations, reflecting an alignment with Western democracies on the matter of 
human rights violations, represent a shift from social competition to social 
mobility. Yet, this posture was not fully consistent. 
A much softer stance was shown by Brazil on the situation in Iran and the 
Philippines. The state abstained from voting in both cases. Particularly sur-
prising was the state’s posture towards Iran as it was inconsistent with the cur-
rent administration’s support for a tough stand on the Islamic Republic.17 The 
17  Brazil participated in the US-led Middle East conference in Warsaw in February 2019 con-




Brazilian delegate in an explanation of the vote expressed the state’s “under-
standing that Iran will undertake additional measures on the protection and 
promotion of human rights” (Brazil, 2019a), which reminded the approach 
assumed by Brazil between 2015 and 2018. In the case of the Philippines, the 
decision raised criticism as it was perceived as ideologically motivated. Presi-
dent Bolsonaro, oftentimes compared with President Rodrigo Duterte, did not 
want to point fingers at another far-right and conservative regime (Brasil se 
abstém em votação na ONU sobre violações de direitos humanos nas Filipi-
nas, 2019, July 12; Duchiade, 2019, July 11).
Causes promoted by the Global South
Between 2006 and March 2016, Brazil voted in favor or even co-sponsored 
resolutions referring to topics promoted by developing countries, thus ex-
pressing its affiliation to the Global South. This affinity was mostly manifested 
in a less confrontational manner than was the case of human rights abuses and 
it can be classified as an example of a social creativity approach. The promot-
ed causes focused on economic, social, and cultural rights as well as national 
sovereignty, such as the right to food; the right to development; international 
solidarity; the right to peace; promotion of a democratic and equitable inter-
national order; the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights; 
the effects of foreign debt on economic, social, and cultural rights; the nega-
tive impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights. 
The initiatives were promoted by Cuba and other members of the NAM – 
Venezuela, Egypt, and Iran – on behalf of the group. Adjustments in Brazil’s 
vote were made after the impeachment of President Rousseff. The administra-
tion of Michel Temer decided to vote against a Cuban-sponsored resolution 
on foreign debt and it abstained from supporting documents referring to the 
democratic and equitable international order and unilateral coercive meas-
ures (the latter sponsored by Venezuela on behalf of NAM). Since 2019 Brazil 
voted against the resolution on the impact of unilateral coercive measures on 
human rights and the effects of foreign debt on human rights. Also, by absten-
tion, the state no longer supported the resolutions on the democratic inter-
national order and the use of mercenaries. The only Cuban-sponsored drafts 
still backed by Brazil were resolutions on the promotion of the right to peace 
and international solidarity. What stood out making a stark contrast with past 
practices was an extremely critical assessment of the Cuban and Venezuelan 
regime when explaining its vote on documents introduced by the Caribbean 
countries. For instance, at the 42nd session in September 2019 the Brazilian 
delegate explained that despite the state’s support for a democratic and eq-
uitable international order, principles of self-determination and sovereignty, 
Brazil would abstain in the voting as “the Government of Cuba lacks the nec-
essary legitimacy to lead the initiative” (Brazil, 2019f). When commenting 
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on a resolution regarding Venezuela, sponsored by Brazil at the same session, 
the state’s representative complained about the criticism faced “at the HRC 
corridors” by the country due to the initiative. Emphasizing the Venezuelan 
humanitarian crisis and the Brazilian support for refugees from the Bolivar-
ian Republic, the representative mentioned twice: “We are not the bad guys.” 
(Brazil, 2019e). The statement was another example of Brazil’s black and white 
perception of the international system, torn by the clash between forces of 
good and evil. Yet, the necessity to remind the UN audience about who the 
“good guys” were, albeit undoubtedly sarcastic, can be read as a signal that 
Brazil’s moral superiority lacks recognition and representatives of the govern-
ment are aware of it. The strong inclination towards ideologically motivated 
initiatives not only exposed a much more critical posture towards regional 
neighbors. The changes, visible since the Temer government and continued in 
the last two years, signal changes in the Brazilian commitment to causes close 
to members of the Global South, thus questioning the state’s adherence to this 
group. In line with the declarations made by Ernesto Araújo who promoted 
Brazil’s profile as a member of the Western civilization, Brazil continues to 
distance itself from developing countries, a shift clearly noticeable in the HRC. 
Yet, a deepening cleavage between Brazil and other developing nations was 
not the only novelty, as it was followed by several unprecedented decisions 
which distanced Brazil also from Western democracies.
Topics introduced and supported by Brazil
Despite criticism faced by Brazil on several occasions due to abstentions in 
votings on human rights violations in several countries, the state also man-
aged to gain recognition and prestige as a promoter of human rights causes. 
Brazilian diplomats proudly emphasized the state’s efforts to raise awareness 
on the incompatibility between democracy and racism, access to medication 
for developing countries, the rights of people with HIV/AIDS and other infec-
tious diseases, rights of people struggling with mental illnesses, older persons, 
and journalists. At the initiative of Brazil, the HRC held special sessions to 
discuss the impact of the global economic crisis on human rights in 2009 and 
the situation in Haiti in 2010. Celso Amorim in 2009 stressed that although 
Brazil led in sponsoring documents referring to economic, social, and cul-
tural rights – initiatives developed within the social creativity strategy through 
which Brazil was gaining visibility as a member of the Global South, able to 
provide innovative solutions and raise awareness on causes particularly im-
portant for the South – the state also paid attention to political and civic rights 
traditionally promoted by members of the North. By giving the example of the 
incompatibility between democracy and racism, a cause first introduced by 
Brazil in 2006 at the 2nd HRC session, the diplomat reassured that Brazil was 




cies, thus, willing to take on mobility strategies.18 In addition, Brazil advocated 
for the adoption of human rights voluntary goals as well as resolutions on the 
enhancement of technical cooperation and capacity building in the field of 
human rights. Another topic raised by Brazil regarded human rights and the 
Internet as well as the right to privacy in the digital age. 
Many of these initiatives were continued by the administrations of Michel 
Temer and Jair Bolsonaro. Access to medication and the right to physical 
and mental health continues to be a cause the Brazilian delegation in Geneva 
advocates for. Other issues include the rights of older persons, the safety of 
journalists19, the negative impact of corruption on human rights, technical co-
operation in the field of human rights, and the right to privacy in the digital 
age. In 2016 and 2017 Brazil also introduced documents aimed at addressing 
the issue of racial discrimination, however, the attention given to this topic 
decreased after January 2019 as the state did not introduce any draft referring 
to this issue since then.
Other causes which Brazil supported between 2006 and 2018, most com-
monly by co-sponsoring them, were i.a. the rights of indigenous peoples, mi-
grants, freedom of religion, prevention of genocide, human trafficking, the 
question of the death penalty, enforced voluntary disappearances, the right to 
peaceful protests, and combating torture. After 2019 Brazil showed signs of 
continuity, backing many of these initiatives as a co-sponsor. Causes that were 
no longer supported by the Latin American state included the rights of indig-
enous people and migrants.20 A novelty since 2019 was the state’s increased 
commitment to combat discrimination based on religion. On numerous oc-
casions leading members of the Brazilian administration, including President 
Bolsonaro, ministers Araújo and Alves raised the issue of persecuted Chris-
tians. Brazil along with Poland and Iraq organized an event to discuss the 
matter of religious persecutions at the 41st HRC session in 2019. During the 
event, the Brazilian representative claimed that Christians were the most per-
secuted religious group in the world (Chade, 2019, July 9). What gained even 
more attention, however, was Brazil’s unprecedented standing on women’s 
rights and gender identity. These initiatives were clear manifestations of social 
18  At later sessions Brazil also introduced resolutions on education as a tool to eliminate 
racism (in 2013), addressing the impact of racism on women’s rights (in 2016) and advocated for 
the elaboration of a declaration promoting the rights of African descendants (in 2017). Brazil’s 
commitment to combating racism was also expressed by co-sponsoring resolutions urging to 
eliminate racism, other forms of racial discrimination and xenophobia, an initiative promoted 
by African states.
19  President Bolsonaro was accused of inciting violence against journalists (Medeiros, 2010, 
January 16).
20  In January 2019, the Bolsonaro administration decided to withdraw from the UN Global 
Compact for Migration initiative despite the state’s engagement in negotiating the international 
non-binding deal in 2018. 
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competition, through which Brazil was to exert and further increase its moral 
authority. 
Brazil was the first country to introduce a resolution proposal on the topic 
of sexual orientation and gender identity at a UN human rights protection 
body in 2003 (Nogueira, 2017, p. 550). After several attempts and adjustments 
of its content, finally, in 2011 the document passed and was reintroduced in 
2014 and 201621 granting Brazil visibility as a promoter of a progressive hu-
man rights agenda. Although in 2019 the country together with Argentina in-
troduced a document on the mandate of the independent expert on protection 
against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender 
identity, its standing on the rights of sexual minorities underwent a significant 
change. At the 41st session in July 2019, the Brazilian representative empha-
sized that the term “gender” lacked a clear definition in HRC documents and 
therefore explained that for the Brazilian delegation it was synonymous with 
“sex”, understood as a biological category (Brazil, 2019d). This new caveat to 
the term “gender” came in line with the instruction received by the Brazil-
ian diplomats from Ernesto Araújo to exclude the term “gender” from their 
vocabulary and use solely the word “sex” (Valadares, 2019, August 7). It also 
stood in stark contrast with previous practices as Brazil actively supported 
documents using this expression. For instance, in September 2017, Brazil in-
troduced a resolution addressing the importance of “mainstreaming a gender 
perspective” into the human rights protection system.22
Efforts to present Brazil as a country engaged in the protection of sexual 
minorities were also limited since 2019. In 2020 at the 44th session, a debate 
was held after the presentation of a report on the global practice of “conver-
sion therapies” for members of the LGBT community. The report stated that 
such practices were taking place in Brazil, provided by religious institutions, 
and pointed out that national legislation prohibiting them did not address the 
problem of “therapies” by “religious interventions”. The Brazilian delegate in 
response after the presentation (Brazil, 2020) tried to clarify the state’s offi-
cial position towards these “therapies”. Although it was emphasized that such 
practices were illegal, the influence of religious groups on the rights of sexual 
minorities was not addressed.
Jair Bolsonaro and Ernesto Araújo on numerous occasions emphasized 
the strong commitment to defending the value of the family, making referenc-
es to the traditional understanding of the family as based on the bond between 
a man and a woman (Bolsonaro, 2019, August 10; Araújo, 2019, October 22). 
These statements contrasted with Brazil’s position on the matter before 2019, 
21  In 2016 Chile introduced the proposal on behalf of Brazil who was not a member of the 
Council at the 32nd session.
22  Resolution 36/8 The full enjoyment of human rights by all women and girls and the sys-





also expressed within the HRC. At the 21st session in September 2012, when 
human rights protection in Brazil was under scrutiny within the universal pe-
riodic review mechanism, Brazil refuted a recommendation made by the Holy 
See to protect the “natural family”. The state’s delegate reminded the audience 
that Brazilian institutions “recognized other family arrangements as also be-
ing eligible for protection” (HRC, 2015, November 11, p. 169). In 2014, 2015, 
and 2017 Brazil abstained from voting on resolutions on the protection of the 
family sponsored by African and Arab states. The country did not support 
the proposal as amendments extending the definition of the family (by add-
ing that “various forms of the family exist”), introduced in 2014 by Uruguay 
and in 2015 by Brazil, were refuted. Although in 2019 and 2020 the topic was 
not raised within the HRC, it is highly improbable that Brazil would back an 
extended understanding of the family including same-sex couples. 
Another area that witnessed unparalleled adjustments referred to women’s 
rights. Since 2009 Brazil sponsored resolutions on women’s rights (on accel-
erating the efforts to eliminate all forms of violence against women – a Ca-
nadian initiative – and on the elimination of discrimination against women, 
promoted by Mexico and Colombia) and voted against amendments proposed 
to these documents by Arab states and Russia. This was the case still in 2018 
when Brazil was against amendment proposals aiming at deleting references 
to the right to evidence-based comprehensive sexual education as well as the 
acknowledgement of violence caused by intimate partners. In the same year at 
the September session, Brazil also rejected an amendment sponsored by Egypt 
and Russia to the resolution on preventable maternal mortality and morbid-
ity in humanitarian settlements. The changes once again aimed at deleting 
references to the right to sexual education. One year later, at the 41st session in 
June, Brazil not only ceased to sponsor drafts introduced by Canada, Mexico, 
and Colombia but also voted in favor of amendments intended to erase refer-
ences to the right to sexual education. Brazil was the only Latin American 
country that backed the Pakistani and Russian proposals, joining the club of 
such countries as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, China, Afghanistan, Iraq, and 
Bangladesh. The Brazilian neighbors, along with European states, were against 
the amendments. At the same session, Brazil voted in a similar vein on the 
European resolution addressing the consequences of child, early, and forced 
marriage. The Latin American state supported a controversial amendment in-
troduced by Bahrain. The proposal suggested binding the right to a compre-
hensive education for women and girls aimed at gender equality and women 
empowerment with “appropriate direction and guidance from parents and le-
gal guardians”, thus introducing a reference to the girl’s family’s consent. Bra-
zil’s new alignment with states associated with ultraconservative postures and 
poor human rights records came as a surprise to Brazil’s partners within the 
HRC as well as the domestic audience. Latin American diplomats, for years 
coordinating initiatives with their Brazilian counterparts, were stunned by the 
drastic shift and new Brazilian vocabulary, questioning established human 
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rights protection standards (Chade, 2019, June 20). The topic was also thrust 
into the national spotlight: main news outlets decried Brazil’s new controver-
sial alliances within the HRC (Duchiade, 2019, July 11; Queiroz, 2019, July 29; 
Senra, 2019, July 17; Chade, 2020, July 3; Maneo, 2020, July 7). In 2020 at the 
44th session, Brazil tried to take a less controversial stand by abstaining from 
the vote on five amendments sponsored by Russia, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, 
yet it did not sponsor the Mexican resolution (on the elimination of all forms 
of discrimination against women and girls). 
It remains highly questionable whether under the Bolsonaro administra-
tion Brazil will manage to overcome associations with a group of countries 
opposed to strengthening human rights. It remains also an open question if 
the state’s decision-makers are interested in overcoming such associations. 
For the past two years, Brazil within the HRC presented an ultraconservative 
posture in the debate over the protection of sexual minorities, the family, the 
rights of women and girls, and by advocating for the protection of persecuted 
Christians rather than focusing on such challenges as discrimination based 
on gender identity and domestic violence that Brazil itself is also facing. The 
state’s decision-makers preferred alignments with countries criticized for hu-
man rights abuses such as Saudi Arabia and Russia over alliances with West-
ern democracies. The described changes can be classified as a move to chal-
lenge the existing agenda on human rights protection and promote alternative 
understandings of rights, within the civilizational war over morality in which 
Brazil is supposedly “the good guy”. If this move is an effort to purge the in-
ternational system by bringing back fundamental values through competing 
with positions defending their established understandings, it is a failed one. 
For Brazil instead of recognition as a member of the global avant-garde gained 
visibility as a state that is losing its credentials as a human rights promoter and 
responsible member of the international community.
Conclusion
Perhaps the most surprising declaration made by a foreign affairs minister 
of a country traditionally recognized for its strive for greatness, the desire of 
grandeza, was the affirmation of Ernesto Araújo in October 2020 that Brazil 
preferred to be an international pariah rather than a “guest at the banquet 
of self-interested cynicism of the globalists”. For the head of Brazilian diplo-
macy, being a pariah was a virtue (Araújo, 2020, October 22). These assertions 
starkly contrasted with past moments when Brazil was in the spotlight as an 
example in the fight against inequality and poverty, a credible actor able to 
convince the international community of its willingness to assume increased 
responsibility for world affairs.
Human rights protection is not an area associated with great power poli-




power, and other increases in strategic material capabilities. States seeking 
status without resorting to hard measures select other areas and non-material 
resources which could increase their standing. International human rights 
promotion is one of them. Actors who aim at proving their international re-
sponsibility and commitment adhere to a set of rules and standards acknowl-
edged by the dominant powers: the United States and, in the niche of human 
rights protection, Western modern liberal democracies having uncompro-
mised human rights standards. Yet, for states with a long tradition of alle-
giance to human rights as a fundamental principle orienting foreign policy, 
this niche of international cooperation remains even more indispensable. Bra-
zil did not procure a strengthened global standing through increases in hard 
power but, since the 20th century, remained committed to the notion of con-
structing prestige through other means. Mediation and diplomatic dialogue, 
peaceful resolution of conflicts, respect for national sovereignty as well as the 
promotion of human rights, were typical instruments used by Brazilian diplo-
mats until recently. If advocating for human rights solely cannot be considered 
a sufficient condition for status enhancement, in the case of soft powers, it is 
a necessary one as moral authority becomes an important way to gain visibil-
ity and recognition.  The commitment to human rights protection is a baseline 
which must be fulfilled for the country to be taken seriously and considered as 
a responsible global player. 
The paper presented two alternative ways of Brazilian status-seeking fo-
cused on the state’s moral authority which brought differing results. Between 
2006 and 2018 Brazil, expressing its profile as both Western liberal democracy 
and a member of the Global South (the latter identity promoted less vigor-
ously by the Temer administration), identified opportunities for status gains 
by engaging in efforts to sustain and develop the international human rights 
system. Performing the role of a good international citizen, the state applied 
a blend of social mobility, creativity, and competition strategies. Although the 
last approach, manifested in reticence towards condemning human rights 
abuses within the HRC, cost Brazil image losses, applying social mobility and 
creativity strategies brought positive outcomes. Brazil was recognized as an 
actor contributing both to causes supported by Western liberal states as well 
as topics important for developing countries. 
The changes palpable within the HRC since 2019 resonated with major 
policy shifts and ideological convictions of key figures responsible for the 
foreign policy design. The populist foreign policy adopted by the govern-
ment was a nod towards President Bolsonaro’s most radical followers and 
evangelicals, the religious community whose representatives were increasing 
their influence over political life in Brazil. The state since 2019 was no longer 
interested in sustaining the human rights protection system. As a defender 
of the faith and endowed with moral superiority, Brazil wished for its thor-
ough redefinition. As frequently repeated by President Bolsonaro and Ernesto 
Araújo in an obvious reference to Evangelist John, it was necessary to bring 
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“the truth back in[to]” the international system. To this end, Brazil engaged in 
a range of activities adopting approaches of social mobility and competition. 
Country representatives aligned their votes with Western states on matters of 
human rights abuses in Venezuela and changed the state’s position on some 
resolutions regarding Israel. Yet, the determination to raise awareness over 
the situation in Cuba and Venezuela seemed to be first and foremost triggered 
by a Manichean vision of the global reality in which those countries, due to 
their ideological affiliations, were classified as foes. This also explains the reti-
cent posture towards Duterte’s rule in the Philippines. The most visible shift 
in the past two years refers to Brazil’s posture on matters of religious freedom, 
the protection of the family, sexual minorities, and women. Putting itself in 
the same row alongside countries such as Russia and Saudi Arabia, known 
for their ultraconservative normative agenda and compromised human rights 
protection standards, took a heavy toll on Brazil’s prestige and authority as 
a human rights promoter. 
The international alignments of Brazil were clearly exposed in January 
2019, when the head of the Brazilian diplomacy stressed the country’s admi-
ration for the U.S., Israel, and Hungary. Nevertheless, entitlement to moral 
authority requires recognition from a broader number of states, including 
members of the clubs recognized for high human rights protection standards. 
Should policymakers stop seeking such recognition, Brazil might fail not only 
to prove who “the good guys” are but also face accusations of “not being a seri-
ous state”.23
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